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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
R. BYRON FERGUSON,

Plaitntiff and A·ppelloot,
vs.

Case No.
7257

J. OSCAR GARRETT and STELLA P.
GARRETT, his wife,
Defendatnts and Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF CASE
The plaintiff brought this action to recover damages,
both general and special, for the breach of a written contract for the sale of real property and for damages sustained by the plaintiff because of the breach of the covenants of a warranty deed executed and delivered by the
defendants to the plaintiff in pursuance of the contract
of sale.
The first document executed by the parties in their
negotiations provides:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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''Received from R. Byron Ferguson the sum
of Two Hundred and Fifty Dollars, to secure
and apply on the purchase of the following described property: Home at 726 North University
Ave. and Store building, including shelving and
heater, and apartment house, consisting of three
3 room apartments, including 3 heaters and ice
box for the purchase price of Twenty-Four Thousand Dollars. The balance of purchase price shall
be paid as follows: Fifteen Thousand Dollars on
or before 90 days from date (above) and the balance $9,000.00 on or before 2 years at 3% interest
per annum until paid. Interest shall be charged
on all unpaid portions of the purchase price at
3% per annum, and possession given in 90 days
(Seller to occupy North apartment for 2 years,
rent free).
Taxes for the current fiscal year ending December 31st, following this date and the insurance,
rents and other expenses of said property shall
be pro-rated as of date of delivery of deed or
final contract of sale. All other taxes and assessments shall be paid by owner except the following: No exceptions. Insurance as written goes
with property.
Contract of sale to be mde on 'the approved
form of the PROVO REAL ESTATE BOARD
in the name of______________________________________________________________ ,
In the event said purchaser shall fail to pay
the balance of said purchase price or complete
said purchase as herein provided, the amounts
paid hereon shall, at the option of the seller, be retained as liquidated and agreed damages.
The payment is received and sale is made subject to owner's approval, and unless so approved
on or before ____________ days from date the return of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the money herein receipted shall cancel this sale
without damage, to the undersigned.
We do hereby agree to carry out and fulfill
the terms and conditions in the above receipt
specified, the owner agreeing to furnish a good
marketable title with abstract to date, or policy
of title insurance and to make final conveyance
by sufficient deed.
NO AGENT

Buyer /s/ R. BYRON FERGUSON
/s/ STELLA P. GARRETT
Seller /s/ J. OSCAR GARRETT

R. 8 and Exhibit "A".
Thereafter the following instrument was executed
by the parties :
"We, J. Oscar Garre·tt and Stella P. Garrett,
husband and wife, the undersigned, acknowledge
receipt of Six Thousand Nine Hundr·ed SeventySeven and 59/100 Dollars, from R. Byron Ferguson and further acknowledge that the method of
payment in the certain Earnest Money Receipt
dated July 29, 1946 by and between said parties
is changed and amended to read :
Seven Thousand Two Hundred and No/100
($7200.00) within 90 days from dat:e (July 29,
1946) and the balance as represented by certain
notes and mortgages executed this 26 day of
October, A. D. 1946 by R. Byron Ferguson and
Faun C. Ferguson, his wife, which is part read
as follows:
1 note dated October 26, 194'6 for $9,000.00,
payable on or before two (2) years from date,
with interest, payable quarterly at the rate of 3
per cent per annutn.
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1 note dated October 26, 1946 for $3,000.00,
payable on or before one (1) year from date, with
interest, payable quarterly at the rate of 5 per
cent per annum.
1 note dated October 26, 1946 for $4,800.00,
payable 75 days from date with no interest.
All of the rest of the provisions of said Earnest Money Receipt (Contract remains unchanged).
/s/ J. OSCAR GARRETT
/s/ STELLA P. GARRETT
Receipt of $27.59 included in the above is for prorated portion of the 1946 general taxes, paid by R. Byron
F·erguson." R. 9 and Exhibit "B".
On October 18th, 1946 the defendants made and
executed a statutory form of warranty deed which provides:
WARRANTY DEED
"J. OSCAR GARRETT and STELLA P.
GARRETT, his wife, Grantors, of Provo, Utah,
hereby CONVEY AND WARRANT to R. BYRON FERGUSON and FAUN C. FERGUSON,
husband and wife as Joint Tennants, with full
right of survivorship, Grantees of Provo, Utah,
for the sum of $12,000.00, Twelve Thousand Dollars and other valuable consideration the following described tract of land in Utah County, State
of Utah, to-wit:
Comm·encing 6 rods North of the Southwest
corner of Block 8, Plat '' D' ', Provo City Survey;
which is also 11 rods North of the N othwest corner of' Block 29, Plat '' C '' Provo City Survey of
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Building Lots ; thence East 9 rods; thence North
6 rods; thence "\Y est 9 rods; thence South 6 rods
to the place of beginning.
$26.95 Revenue Stamps.
"\YITXESS THE HANDS of said Grantors
this 18th day of October, A. D. 1946.
Signed in the presence of

Is! J. OSCAR GARRETT
/s/ WESTON GARRETT
/s/ STELLA P. GARRETT
STATE OF UTAH

)

) ss.

County of Utah----------------------)
On the 18th day of October, A. D. 1946, personally appeared before me, a Notary Public in
and for the State of Utah, J. OSCAR GARRETT
and STELLA P. GARRETT, his wife, the signers
of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged
to me that they executed the same.
/s/ A. K. BREINHOL.T
N ot•ary Public
(SEAL)
Residing at Provo, Utah
My Commission Expires 8-17-49''
R. 10 and Exhibit "C ".
It is in substance alleged in the complaint that at
the time plaintiff entered into negotiations for the ·purchase from the defendants of a store building, a home
and a three unit apartment house located at 726 North
University Avenue in Provo, Utah, he, the plaintiff, was
engaged in the business of coal trucking, operating a
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farm west of Provo and feeding some cattle for beef.
That he had been injured and desired to purchase defendants' property for the purpose of living in one of
the apartments, renting the other apartments and conducting a grocery store and meat market in the store
building which were on the premises which he sought to
purchase. That prior to and during the negotiations
for the purchase of the premises and the improvements
on the property plaintiff informed the defendants of the
purposes for which he, the plaintiff, desired to purchase
the property. That at the time the negotiations for the
purchase of the property were being conducted and at
the time the property was conveyed to the plaintiff by
the defendants there was a tenant in possession of the
store building. According to the allegations of the complaint ·the defendants informed the plaintiff that the
tenant so in possession of the store building was renting
the same from month to month. R-1 to 6.
Plaintiff also alleges that prior to bringing his action he had demanded possession of the store building,
but was unable to secure possession thereof to his damage in the sum of $500.00 per month from November 1st,
1946 until he secured possession thereof, $1050 loss on
the sale of cattle and $300.00 feed bill on the cattle which
he held for the purpose of selling at retail in the store
building and $200.00 for the depreciation of 'the equipment which he bought for use in the store building and
for costs. That the reasonable rental value of the store
building was and is $150.00 per montJ1.
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In their answer the defendants admit the execution
of the written instruments above mentioned. They also
admit that demand was Inade for the possession of the
store building. They deny that they informed the plaintiff that the tenant, who was in possession of the store
building was leasing such building from month to month
and they allege the fact to be that they, the defendants,
during the negotiations for the sale of the property,
informed the plaintiff that the store building was leased
and that possession of the property would be given subject to the lease on the store building. R. 19 to 24. The
lease on the store building was admitted in evidence as
defendants' Exhibit 1.
At the trial the parties offered evidence in support
of their respective allegations. At the conclusion of the
evidence and argument of counsel the trial court found
the issues in favor of the defendants and against the
plaintiff and entered judgment accordingly. Plaintiff
prosecutes this appeal from the judgment so entered.
There are two fundamental questions presented for
determination on this appeal. They are :

1. Is parol evidence competent to vary the terms
of a written contract for the sale of real estate and of a
statutory Warranty Deed given to consummate such
contract~

2. In case of a breach of a contract for the sale of
real estate and of the covenants contained in a Warranty
Deed may the injured party recover special damages
for the breach, or is such injured party limited to reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
cover merely the reasonable rental value of the property
during the time he is deprived of the possession thereof?

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
The plaintiff and appellant assigns the following
errors upon which he relies for a reversal of the judgment appealed from:
1. The trial court erred in denying the motion to
strike the following allegations from paragraph 6 on
page 2 of defendants' answer, ''and in that connectionalleges that prior to its execution by defendants they advised plaintiff that they would deliver possession of said
premises subject to the existing leases and tenancies
existing thereon and prior to July 29, 1946, including the
leases on the store building.'' R. 28 and Tr. 1.
2. The trial court erred in denying the motion to
strike the following allegations from paragraph 10 on
page 3 of defendants' answer, "subject to all leases and
tenancies existing thereon'' and in that connection allege
that prior to July 29, 1946 defendants specifically in.formed plaintiff that they could not and would not deliver
possession of the said store building as the tenant therein
occupied same under a lease which had not expired, and
being so informed the plaintiff agreed and undertook in
the agreement of sale of said premises to accept possession of said store building and premises, subject to said
leases hereinafter set forth in defendants' affirmative
answer." R. 28 and Tr. 1.
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3. The trial court erred in refusing to strike from
paragraph 11 on page 3 of defendants' answer the following: ''and in that connection the defendants allege
that possession of same was delivered strictly in accordance with the agreement between plaintiff and defendants and subject to leases and tenancies existing
on said premises including the store building lease as
hereinafter alleged.'' R. 28.
4. The trial court erred in refusing to strike from
paragraph 11 on page 3 of defendants' answ~er the following allegation: ''and subject to leases and tenancies
existing on said premises including store building lease
as hereinafter alleged.''
5. The trial court erred in refusing to strike from
defendants' answer the following allegation: ''that during those negotiations and on or about July 15, 1946, defendants advised plaintiff that one Haddock had possession of the store building situated on said premises
under a lease." R. 28 and Tr. 1.
6. The trial court erred in refusing to strike from
paragraph 2 on page 4 of defendants' answer the following allegation: ''and that defendants would he unable
to remove said tenant." R. 28 and Tr.l.
7. The trial court erred in refusing to strike from
paragraph 2 on page 4 of defendants' answer the following allegation: ''and if the sale was made plain,tiff
would have to take possession of said store subject to
the tenants rights under said lease." R. 28 and Tr. 1.
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8. The trial court erred in refusing to strike from
paragraph 2 on page 4 of defendants' answer the following allegation: ''that the plaintiff being so advised and
fully informed concerning said Haddock lease on the
store building then and there undertook and agreed that
if defendants would sell said premises to him that he
would assume the obligation of getting the Haddocks
out of the store.'' R. 29 and Tr. 1.
9. The trial court erred in refusing to strike from
paragraph 2 on page 4 of the defendants' answer the
following allegation: ''and plaintiff further stated to
defendants that while he was waiting for the Haddocks
to vacate said store he had other things he could be
doing, to-wit: operate his coal business, operate his farm
and orchard in Orem, Utah, operate his real estate and
his insurance business.'' R. 29.
10. The trial court erred in refusing to strike from
paragraph 3 on page 4 of the defendants' answer the
following allegation: ''that pursuant to the said agreement of plaintiff to purchase the said premises subject
to the rights of the tenants in possession and particularly
tenant Haddock's rights under his lease for said store
building, the defendants signed said earnest money
memorando Exhibits "A'' and "B", aforesaid, on July
29 and October 2,6, 1946, respectively." R. 29 and Tr. 1.
11. The trial court erred in refusing to strike from
paragraph 3, page 4 of the defendants' answer the following allegation: '' tha:t further in pursuance of said
Agreement and on or about August 3, 1946, defendants
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notified their tenant Haddock that the plaintiff was the
new owner of said premises, including the store building
occupied by him, and to pay rent to him thereafter.''
R. 29 and Tr. 1.
12. The trial court erred in refusing to strike from
paragraph 3 on page 4, of the defendants' answer the
following allegation: "and that pursuant to said plaintiff's agreement, and not otherwise, defendants on November 1, 1946, delivered possession of the entire premises, including said store building to plaintiff.'' R. 29 and:
Tr.l.

13. The trial court ·erred in refusing to strike from
paragraph 3 on page 4 of the defendants' answer the following allegation: "subject to the existing rights of
tenants occupying said premises, and particularly the
lease rights of said tenant Haddock in said store building.'' R. 29 and ·Tr. 1.
14. The trial court erred in refusing to strike from
paragraph 3 on page 5 of defendants' answer the following allegation: "and that plaintiff received possession
of said premises as aforesaid on said last mentioned date
and now has same, and has had and enjoyed same at all
times since.'' R. 29 and Tr. 1.
15. The trial court erred in refusing to strike from
paragraph 4 on page 5 of defendants' answer the following allegation: "That within a day or two after said
agreement was made, on or about August 1, 1946, so
defendants are informed and believe, the plaintiff went
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to the said tenant Haddock and demanded immediate
possession of said store building, and said tenant refused to surrender possession thereof to the plaintiff
stating to him that his (Haddock's) lease had not expired." R. 29 and Tr. 1.
16. The trial court erred in refusing to strike from
paragraph 4, page 5, of defendants' answer the following allegation: ''that subsequently and on or about October 16, 1946, plaintiff advised defendants that said Haddock refused to surrender possession of said store building, at which time defendants offered to call the whole
deal off and postpone it until said Haddock's lease had
expired." R. 29 and Tr. 1.
17. The trial court erred in refusing to strike from
paragraph 4, page 5 of defendants' answer the following
allegation: ''but that plaintiff then and there advised
defendants that he was not worried, and that he could
get the Haddocks out of the store building in 30 days
and that he wanted to go through with the deal." R. 29
and Tr. 1.

18. The trial court erred in refusing to strike from
paragraph 4 on page 5 of defendants' answer the following allegation: "that thereupon defendants reminded
plaintiff of his agreement to accept possession of said
store building subject to Haddock's lease rights and that
plaintiff was going to do other things until said lease
expired, whereupon the plaintiff told defendants he had
changed his mind." R. 29 and Tr. 1.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
19. The trial court erred in refusing to strike from
paragraph 5 on page 3 of defendants' answer the following allegation: "that defendants have fully performed
their agreement with plaintiff for the sale of said premises, and have delivered possession of the same, and particularly the said store building, to the plaintiff in accordance with the said agreement subject to the lease
rights of the said tenant Haddock.'' R. 30 and Tr. 1.
20. The trial court erred in refusing to strike from
paragraph 6 on page 5 of the defendants' answer the following allegation: ''that if the plaintiff has suffered any
damage by reason of said transaction, it is not due to
any failure of defendants to perform their said agreement, but is a result of the plaintiff's own breach of his
agreement to accept possession of said premises subject
to the right of said tenant Haddock ·to posession of said
store building.'' R. 30 and Tr.l.
21. The trial court erred in overruling the obj ections to the testimony of Mrs. Haddock touching the
tender of checks to Mr. Ferguson and ·the admission in
evidence of such checks. Tr. 46-50.
22. The trial court erred in sustaining objection to
the following question asked plaintiff: "How much did
it cost you to feed the cattle from November 1st, 1946
until the time you sold them~'' Tr. 65-66.
23. The trial court erred in striking the following
answer of the plaintiff: ''I had made arrangements with
the Provo Packing Company by the steel plant to slaughter these cattle as I needed them and hold them in their
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ice box, cure them. They were to be sold over the counter,
meat counter.'' Tr. 66.
24 The trial court erred in sustaining objection
to the following question asked plaintiff: "What were
your earnings in the last few months that you were in
·the coal trucking business~ '' Tr. 67.
24. The trial court erred in sustaining the objection
to the following question: ''Now from the amount you
did earn when you went in the real estate business, do
you have a judgment what you could have earned by
way of commission with Rowan & Grow~" Tr. 74.
25. The trial court erred in sustaining the objection
to the following question asked of the plaintiff: ''Well
how much did you make on an average in the real estate
business after you did get in the real estate business, for
the ensuing few months~" Tr. 75.
In order that the court may better understand the
assigned errors touching the admission of parol evid~nce
touching the terms of ·the written contract and warranty
deed we quote the following from the objections of one
of counsel for the plaintiff:
''If the court please, at this time, in order to save
time and not keep butting in, we object to any conversation had if it is intended by the conversation to vary
the terms of this written instrument that has been offered
in evidence, any conversation if it is calculated in any
way to vary the terms of the writt~n instrument, the
contract, the written contract, and warranty deed. \Ve
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would like to have it understood any such testilnony is
objected to without interposing that objection too frequently. Of course, we can object to them as they come
up, if that is ·preferable. We thought we would save
time.',- Tr. 138.
''The court: The record may ·show your objection
against the same, for the purpose indicated." Tr. 138.
26. The trial court erred in admitting and in refusing to strike that part of the testimony of Mrs. Garrett where she testified: "That Mr. Garrett said 'I
have people with a contract on the store and I can't let
you have the store.' He said: 'Well that don't make any
difference to me'." Tr. 140.
27. The trial court erred in admitting in evidence
and refusing to strike the following testimony of Mrs.
Garrett: "as Mr. Ferguson, as he had said he would take
the property with the lease." Tr. 144.
28. The trial court erred in admitting in evidence
and in refusing to strike the following testimony of Mrs.
Garrett : ''I know that was the time that 1fr. Garrett
said that when the Haddocks lease had expired, at the
expiration of two years lease, he thought the contract or
lease \Vas on a month to month basis, and that the
Haddocks thought the clause in the lease gave them the
privilege of staying another two years. Then Mr. Ferguson asked about the clause in the lease, and he said he was
not worried about the lease, or the clause in the lease,
that he could easily get the Haddocks out in thirty days.
J\fr. Garrett snys: 'Now, l\Ir. Ferguson, you know I must
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have Haddocks taken care of.' He says: 'Sure, sure'."
Tr. 148.
29. The trial court erred in permitting Mrs. Garrett to testify and in refusing to strike the following part
of her testimony: "Q. Is that a week after July 29th?
A. The 29th. I would say around Thursday or Friday,
Mr. Ferguson came to my door and said: 'Mrs. Garrett,
will you tell me exactly how your lease reads with the
Haddocks?' I said: 'Our lease calls for an option of
staying two years and there is a clause in the lease giving
them the privilege of staying two more years.' }.1:r.
Ferguson said: 'Did they ever serve any papers on you,
any writing about it.' I said: 'No.' He said: 'Then it is
not worth the paper it is written on'." Tr. 150.
30. The trial court erred in permitting Mrs. Garrett to testify and in refusing to strike the following
testimony: "Mr. Ferguson said, 'Mrs. Garrett, will you
tell 1Ir. Garrett to get the I-Iaddocks out of the store?'
I said: 'M~r. Ferguson we understood you didn't want the
store.' He said: I have changed my mind; my lawyer
says I can get the Haddocks out of the store'. I said:
'Mr. Ferguson, why don't you get them out?' He said.:
'Because my lawyer said it is Mr. Garrertt's place to get
them out'." Tr. 153.

31. The trial court erred in permitting Mrs. Garrett to testify and in refusing to strike the following:
''He said he would take that responsibility himself.''
(getting the Haddocks out). On that occassion he said he
had changed his mind.'' Tr. 153.
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32. The trial court erred in admitting in evidence
over the objection of the plaintiff a purported copy of
the letter shown at page 159 of the transcript.
It should be noted that at the commencement of the
testimony of defendent J. Oscar Garrett one of counsel
for the plaintiff made the following objection:.'' May
we have the same objection to all of the testimony that
this witness may give with respect to these particular
conversation, that it tends to vary the terms of the written instruments, insofar as they tend to vary the terms of
the written instruments, that they are incompetent,
for that reason." The court: "The record may so show."
Tr. 178.
33. The trial court erred in permitting Mr. Garrett
to testify and refusing to strike the following part of his
testimony: "I have had Haddocks in the store and
they have a contract, so I can't put them out. These other
people that asked to buy my property wanted to take
immediate possession, so I didn't sell to them. Mr. Ferguson said: "That is all right, I have several other
things to do." Tr. 178-179.
34. The trial court erred in admitting in evidence
and in refusing to strike the testimony of ?\fr. Garrett
wherein he testified: "I told him (Ferguson) I thought
it (lease) was running on a month to month basis, but the
Haddocks insisted that they was entitled to remain in the
store. Mr. Ferguson said the law reads I only have to
give them thirty days notice and then they will havP. to
get out. I turned to Mr. Ferguson and I said, in subSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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stance, 'l\1r. Ferguson, I want the Haddocks taken care
of.' He said : 'Sure, sure'." Tr. 183-184.
35. The trial court erred in overruling plaintiff's
objection to the following question: "Now from your
conversations with plaintiff before July 29, 1946 what
was your understanding when you wrote the words
''possession to be given in ninety days'' into the Ernest
~foney Agreement that has been introduced~" Tr. 194.
36. The trial court erred in admitting in evidence
over ~the objection of plaintiff the testimony of Mignon
Garrett wherein she testified that her mother said: ''Mr.
Ferguson why are you so interested in having Haddocks
get out of the store when you told us they could stay in
there as long as their contract was good~ He said: ''I
have changed my mind.'' Tr. 232.
37. The trial court erred in permitting, over plaintiff's objection, the witness Jay Garrett to testify: "He
said: (apparently meaning ~the defendant Mr. Garrett) I
have a contract with the Haddocks in the store and I
must give them a chance to.'' I think he said ''I must
take care of the Haddocks." Mr. Ferguson said: "Well,
that is all right; while I am waiting I have some other
businesses that I can go into." Tr. 236.
38. ·The trial court erred in admitting the following
testimony of the witness Jay Garrett. ''Father said:
'Well, Mr. Ferguson, I understood that you were going
to take care of the Haddocks'. And I turned to ~Ir.
Ferguson, I said: 'Mr. Ferguson, right down deep in
your heart, you knew that you were to take care of the
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Haddocks.' He said: ·Jay, you know that
Tr. 239.

IS

a lie'."

39. The trial court erred in making that part of its
finding number 3 wherein it found: ''That during those
negotiations and on or about July 15, 1946 defendants
advised the plaintiff that if the sale was made the plaintiff would have to take the property subject to the right
of the said Haddock who would have to be taken care of.
R. 51-52. That such finding is without support by any
competent evidence and it at variance with the written
contract of sale and with the covenants contained in the
warranty deed executed and delivered to the plaintiff.
R. 51-52.
40. The trial court erred in making that part of its
finding numbered 3 wherein it found: ''that the plaintiff
-represented to the defendants that if they would sell
said premises to him the plaintiff would assume the
obligation of getting Haddock out of the store." That
such finding is without support by any competent evidence and is at variance mth the written instruments
·which constitute the agreement of the parties to this
litigation. R. 52.
41. The trial court erred in making that part of its
finding numbered 4 wherein it found: ''That pursuant
to and acting in reliance upon said representations of the
plaintiff to purchase said premises subject to the rights
of the tenants in possession, particularly by Haddocks'
rights under his lease for said store building the defendents signed the said agreements A and B." That such
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finding is wholly unsupported by any competent evidence. R. 52.
42. The trial court erred in making that part of its
finding numbered 4 wherein it found that defendants
''acting in reliance upon said representations (of plaintiff's) the defendants made, executed and delivered their
warranty deed to the plaintiff." That such finding is
wholly without support by any competent evidence. R.
52.
43. The trial court erred in that part of its finding
nmnbered 4 wherein it found: ''that pursuant to their
agreement with the ·plaintiff the defendants served a
written notice on Don D. Haddock.'' That such finding
is wholly without support in the evidence in that there
is no evidence that the defendants undertook or agreed
to serve any written notice on Haddock. R. 62.

44. The trial court erred in finding: ''that pursuant to said agreement defendants on Nov. 1st, 1946
delivered possession of the entire premises including the
store building to the plaintiff-and plaintiff received
possession of said premises - on November 1, 1946.''
That said finding in so far as it applies to the store
building is wholly without support in the evidence. Tr. 52.
45. The trial court erred in making iots finding numbered 5 and the whole thereof. That such finding is
wholly without support by any competent evidence. R.
52.
46. The trial court erred in making its so-called
finding numbered 6 and particularly in that such soSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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called finding is not a finding of any fact but is a mere
conclusion of law and if it should be a finding of fact it
is without supp<>rt in the evidence. R. 53.
47. The trial court erred in failing to find on all of
the issues of facts raised by the pleadings.
48. The trial court erred in making its conclusion
of law No. 1 in that the same is without support in the
evidence. It is not supported by the findings of fact and
is contrary to law. R. 53.
49. The trial court erred in entering judgment in
favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff in that
such judgment is without support in the evidence but
is contrary thereto and is likewise without support in the
findings of fact and the same is contrary to law. R. 53.
ARGUMENT
The questions presented by this appeal are:
1. May defendants in an action to recover damages
for the breach of a written contract and for the breach of
the covenants of a statutory warranty deed, where no
fraud or mistake is claimed, after having admitted the
execution of such written contract and statutory warranty deed properly plead as a defense to such action
oral statements alleged to have been made by the plaintiff
prior to the execution of such written contract and statu. tory warranty deed~

2. Is parol evidence properly admitted to show
that the words ''possession given in 90 days (Seller to
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occupy N. apt for 2 years rent free) "contained in a
written contract for the sale and purchase of real property are ambiguous or uncertain and for that reason
subject to be explained by such parol evidence~
3. Are the covenants of a statutory warranty deed
broken when the property conveyed thereby is subject
to a lease~
4. May a plaintiff, who has pleaded special damages
recover such damages on account of profits which he
would have realized from selling cattle owned by him
in a store building which he has purchased but which he
IS unable to secure possession of, where the defendants
prior to the purchase of such store building were informed of the purposes for which such store building
was being purchased~
5. Does a finding that the allegations of a complaint are untrue constitute such a finding of fact as is
required by law~
6. Are the findings of fact in this case supported by
any competent evidence~
7. Are the conclusions of law in this case supported
by the evidence or by the findings of fact~
8. Is the judgTnent in this case supported by the
evidence or the findings of fact~

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYIKG THE
MOTION TO STRIKE THE VARIOUS ALLEGATIONS SOUGHT BY PLAINTIFF'S 1\IOTION TO
HAVE STRICKEN.
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In assignments numbered 1 to 20 plaintiff attacks the refusal of the trial court to strike from defendant's ans"~er various allegations contained in their
answer. The allegations so sought to be stricken are so
~imilar that in our Yiew the law applicable to each of
them applies to all and therefore all of such assignments
will be discussed together.
It "'ill be noted that in their answer the defendants
admit that they executed Exhibits "A", "B" and
"C" which are attached to and made a part of plaintiff's
complaint and w·hich have heretofore been quoted in this
brief. That being so all prior negotiations were merged
in such written documents. All of the oral negotiations
which were had leading up to the execution of the written
instruments thus ceased to have any legal effect as to the
terms of the transaction. The law is well settled that
in the absence of fraud ''a written contract merges all
prior and contemporaneous negotiations on the subject,
together with all prior oral contracts, and together with
and including antecedent correspondence and prior written memorandums." 17 C. J. S. pages 872-874, Sec. 381.
Numerous cases are collected in foot notes to the text,
among them being Last Chance Ranch Co. vs. Erickson,
25 Pac. (2d) 952; 82 Utah 475; State Bank of Sevier vs.
American Cen1ent and Plaster Co., 10 Pac. (2) 1065; 80
Utah 255; Field vs. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 290 Pac.
979; 77 Utah 45; Halloran Judge Trust Co. vs. Heath
258 Pac. 342 ; 70 Utah 124; 64 A. L. R. 368. We have
examined a number of the cases cited and particularly
those from this jurisdiction. Needless to say that the law
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announced in the text and the cited cases is so well established as to require no argument in support thereof.
It was suggested at the trial of this cause that because the plaintif in his complaint alleged that certain
oral statements were made in the course of the negotiations leading up to the execution of the written instruments which constituted the final consummation of the
transaction that therefore the plaintiff waived any rights
that he might otherwise have had to insist on a compliance with the contract as finally agreed upon and as
evidenced by the written instruments.

No where in the complaint does the plaintiff question
the fact that the written instruments constitute the complete agreement.
The sole purpose of pleading the conversations had
prior to the execution of the written instruments was
to make out a case for special damages.
It is of course elementary law that before special
damages may be granted the facts relied upon as a basis
for special damages must be alleged and proven. See 25
C.J.S., page 755, Subsection 2 and cases there cited in
foot notes.
We do not contend that defendants in their answer
were precluded from denying the allegwtions of the complaint touching the question of special damages but we do
most ernestly contend that the defendants having admitted the execution of the 'vritten instruments was precluded from claiming that the conversation had prior or
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at the time such instruments were executed, modified
said written instruments.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN
EVIDENCE CONv~RS.ATIONS CLAIMED BY THE
DEFENDANTS TO HAVE BEEN HAD PRIOR TO,
AT THE TIME AND SUBSEQUENT TO THE EXECUTION OF THE WRITTEN CONTRACTS AND
THE STATUTORY WARRANTY DEED, EXHIBITS
''A,'' ''B'' AND ''C,'' IN SO FAR AS THE SAl\fE
l\IAY MODIFY SUCH INSTRUMENTS.
\Ve have heretofore in this brief under the preceding
heading directed the court's attention :to the uniformly
established law which precludes the admission of oral
evidence which is calculated to add to, detract from or
otherwise vary the terms of a written instrument. The
law in such particular is so well established that we shall
assume opposing counsel will not contend the law to he
otherwise.
In our assignments numbered 21 to 38, both inclusive, we have attacked the ruling of the court in admitting in evidence oral testimony which offends against
such law in so far as such evidence was reeeived for
the purpose of adding to, detracting from or otherwise
varying the terms of the written instruments, Exhibits
''A,'' '' B'' and '' C,'' which are heretofore quoted at
length in this brief.
If there was any basis for the admission of such oral
testimony it must be that the written instruments were
deemed ambiguous or uncertain.
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It will be noted that Exhibit'' A,'' the earnest money
agreement, provides that possesion is to be ''given in
90 days (seller to occupy north apartment for two years
rent free). That instrum·ent was drawn by the defendant J. Oscar Garrett and therefore the same should be
construed, if it is subject to construction, against him.
It will be observed that the defendant J. Oscar
Garrett put in the contract a provision that the plaintiff
was not to have possession, for two years, of the part
of the premises that were to be occupied by the defendants. If it was necessary for defendants to reserve said
right it would seem that it was equally necessary for the
defendants to make provision that the Haddocks should
remain in possession, if such was in fact the agre·ement.
Certainly so far as the plaintiff was concerned he was
not in possession of the store building any more than he
was given possession of the part of the premises retained
by the defendants.

What con~titutes possesion of lands has been before
the courts on numerous occasions. In National Cypress
Pole Piling Co. vs. Hemphill Lumber Co., 31 SW (2d)
1059; 1063; 325 Mo. 807, a number of cases are cited and
discussed. The following citation from 49 C. J. page
1094 is approved:
''Possession of land has been defined as the
actual control by physical occupation, and the
holding and exercise of dominion over it; the imm·ediate and exclusive dominion over it; that position or relation which gives to one its use and
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control and excludes all others from like use or
control."
In the case of Brewer vs. Curtis, 197 A 780, 783,
130 Pa. Supra 270 and again in Moore v. Boyd, 30 P.
(2d) 502, 503, 59 App. D. C. 252 it is held that possession
of land means the exclusive exercise of dominion over
land in the sense of occupancy.
In the case of Bank of America Nat. Trust and
Savings Assn. vs. Bank of Amador County, 28 Pac. (2d)
86, 89; 135 Cal. App. 714, the court quotes with approval
the text from 49 C. J. page 1094 heretofore referred to
in the case of National Cypress Pole Puling Co. vs.
Hemphill. In the California case last cited a number of
other cases are cited and discussed.
The ~ases above cited are, we believe, sufficient to
advise the court of the trend of judicial authority. But
this case is not controlled alone by the language of the
original contract, because that contract was merged in
the warranty deed which, together with the mortgage
given for the balance of the purchase price, constituted
the consumated agreement.
We have a statute, U. C. A. 1943, 78-1-11, which prescribes the form of a warranty deed. That is the form of
the deed given by the defendants to the plaintiffs. The
affect of such a deed is thus provided for by the section
above referred to.
'' Such deed when executed as required by
law shall have the ,effect of a conveyance in fee
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simple to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, of
the premises therein named, together with all the
appurtenances, rights and privileges thereunto
belonging that he is lawfully seized of the premises; that he has good right to convey the same,
that he guarantees the grantee his heirs and assigns the quiet possession thereof; that the premises are free from all encumbrances and that the
grantor, heir, heirs and personal representatives
will forever warrant and defend the title thereto
in the grantee, his heirs and assigns against all
lawful claims whatsoever. Any exceptions to such
covenants may be briefly inserted in such deed
following the description of the land.''
The uniform holding of the courts so far as we are
able to ascertain is in accord with the statement of the
law contained in Vol. 7, Sec. 3740, page 214 of Thompson
on Real Property where it is said:
''A covenant of general warranty is the
broadest and most effective ·covenant in a deed
and warrants that the grantor has not conveyed
the property described therein or any right, title
or interest therein to any person other than the
grantee, and that the property is free from encumbrances.''
Such is the holding of our own Supreme Court in Van
Cott vs. Jacklin, 62 Utah 412; 226 Pac. 460. We quote
the following from that case. In the Pacific Reporter,
page 461 it is said :
''As every lawyer well knows, the law is well
settled that deeds, like all other written instruments, may not be contradicted, varied or added
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to by parole. While that is not precisely what was
attempted in this case in the form just stated, yet
limiting plaintiff's rights to the boundary lines as
they appear upon the land is in legal effect the
same as though the defendant had been permitted
to vary the terms of the written description of
the lands conveyed by him and to withdraw the
small area in disput from the effect of his covenants of warranty and for quiet enjoyment. The
foregoing covenants are inserted in deeds of conveyance as against any defect of title and he has
a right to rely on the deed as written as against
verbal statements to the contrary. The law is
well stated in :Jiaupen, Marketable Title to Real
Estate at page 335 thus :
''The covenants of warranty is intended as
much for the protection of the purchaser against
known defects of title as against those which are
latent and unknown. It is therefore no defense to
an action on the covenant that the purchaser knew
at the time it was taken that ther~e was an adverse
claim to the land.''
A number of other cases are cited in the Utah case above
referred to and an examination of such cases support
what is claimed for them.
"The inability of the purchas·er to enter into
possession of the land without committing a trespass by reason of the paramount title being in
another has the same effect as respects the right
of action for a breach of covenants contained in
the deed, as would an eviction if possession had
been acquired. The purchase of a paramount
title in the face of its assertion and to avoid suit
thereon is equivalent to an eviction authorizing an
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action for breach.'' 7 Thompson on Real Property, Sec. 3763, page 234.
The following cases are cited in a foot note which
supports the text: Fritz vs. Pusey, 31 Minn. 368, 18 N.vV.
94, Resser vs, Carney, 52 Minn. 397; 54 N. W. 89; Shattuck vs. Laub, 65 N.Y. 499; 22 Am. Rep. 656; Jayha vs.
Smith 132 Ga. 779, 65 S. E. 68, Shaw vs. Guthrie, 14 Ga.
App., 303; 80 S.E. 735; Dornell vs. Thompson, 10 Maine
170; 25 Am. Dec. 629 ; Brooks vs. Mohl, 104 Minn. 404;
116 N. W. 931; Drury vs. Shummray, 1 Am. Dec. 704;
Morgan vs. Haley, 107 V a. 331; 58 S. E. 564.
So also is there a constructive eviction when the
purchaser is unable to obtain possession by reason of a
paramount title and possession in another. The purchaser is not required to commit a tresspass in his
endeavor to make an actual entry. The covenant is
broken when at the time of the conveyance the land is
encumbered by a lease under which the lessee holds possession with an agreement to convey the land to him on
the payment of a certain sum. 7 Thompson on Real Property, Sec. 3764, page 235. Among the cases cited in support of the text are: Playter vs. Cunningham, 21 Cal.
229; Planter vs. Vincent 187 Cal. 443; 202 Pac. 655;
Claflin vs. Case, 53 Kan. 5'60; 36 Pac. 1062; Green vs.
Baker, 66 Mont. 568; 214 Pac. 88.
''The possession of one holding adversely to
the grantee is prima facie evidence of title in
the adverse holder and of eviction of the grantee.
In an action to recover damages for a breach of
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joyment, the plaintiff, to establish prima facie
the breaches alleges, is required merely to prove
that he has either been evicted or kept out of possession by one in actual possession claiming title
paramount to his own.'' 7 Thompson Real Property, Sec. 3767, page 237 and cases cited in foot
notes to the text.
We shall not burden the court with an analysis of the
cases cited in the foot notes to the text just cited but
observe that they are all to the effect that when a warranty deed (such as is provided by our law) is given the
covenants thereof are all inclusive. We think no one
would seriously contend that such a deed does not warrant against the existance of a lease upon the lands conveyed, or if such a contention should be made it is wholly
withou't support in the authorities. The existance of a
lease is an encumbrance. It prevents the owner of the
premises from the peaceable enjoyment thereof. In our
search we have not found a case which holds or lends
sup,port to the claim that the covenants of a warranty
deed, such as that here involved, are not breached if and
when there is a lease on the premises conveyed.
It may also be noted that even if, contrary to our
contention, the parol evidence offered by the defendant
should be properly received it is doubtful if the same
can be given any legal effect. Such loose s1tatements as
the plaintiff should take care of the Haddocks could
mean many things. There is no evidence that plaintiff
was advised of the terms of the lease at or prior to the
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ously any conversation had with respect to the Haddock
lease after the plaintiff received the deed could have no
binding effect upon the rights of the parties.
There is some evidence touching the question of
whether or not the Haddock lease was valid. No useful
purpose could be served by discussing the lease because
whatever conclusion may be reached with respect thereto
the defendants undertook by their agreement in the contract and by the warranty deed to put the plaintiff in
possession and having failed to do so they should respond in damages.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF THE SPECIAL DAMAGES
PLEADED BY THE PLAINTIFF.
Of course, this court may not fix the damages sus\ained by the plaintiff on account if the hreaeh of the
contract and the covenants contained in the warranty
deed. However, if a new trial is ordered as plaintiff
contends it should be the question of special damages
is certain to come up again at the new trial.
The trial court evidently took the view that no recovery may be had for anticipated profits that may be
derived from conducting a business. The current decision of the courts of last resort hold to the contrary. The
law in such particular is thus stated in 15 Am. J ur., page
456, Sec. 53 :
''In addition to general damages, one injured by the breach of a contract to which he is a
party is entitled to recover special damages which
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arise from circumstances peculiar to the particular case, where those circumstances were communicated to, or known by, the other party at the time
the contract was made; that is, he may recover
such damages as are the reasonable and natural
consequences of the breach under the circumstances so disclosed and as may reasonably be
supposed to have been in the contemplation of
both parties.''
Further quoting from 15 A. Jur., page 561, Sec. 151
it is said:
''As a general rule, profits which would have
been realized if a contract had been performed
may be recovered as damages for its breach, provided they are susceptible of being ascertained
with reasonable certainty * * * . ''
The evidence shows without conflict that the defendants prior to and at the time the contracts and deed
were executed knew that plaintiff was purchasing the
premises for the purpose of conducting therein a grocery
store and meat market and that he owned some beef
cattle which he intended to sell through the meat market.
It is plaintiff's contention that the court erred in excluding evidence calculated to show the profits he would have
realized from the operation of the store and meat market
if he had been given possession of the property.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND
ON ALL OF THE ISSUES.
It will be noted that in its finding numbered 6, R-53,
the trial court merely found in effect that the allegations
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in the complaint in so far as the same conflicted with the
other findings made by the court were untrue. This
court has repeatedly held that such a finding is not a
compliance with the provisions of U. C. A. 1943, 104-26-3.
That statute has upon numerous occasions been construed by this court. Among such cases are: Giuque vs.
Salt Lake City, 42 Ut. 89; 127 Pac. 429. Baker vs. Hatch,
70 Ut. 1; 257 Pac. 673. Prows vs. Hawley, 72 Ut. 444;
271 Pac. 31.
The failure to make findings upon all material issues
is reversible error. Popes vs. Eakle, 78 Utah 342; 2 Pac.
(2d) 909. West vs. Standard Fuel Co. 81 Utah 178; 17
Pac. (2d) 292.
NEITHER THE FINDINGS OF FACT, THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW NOR THE JUDGEMENT IS
SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE AND
NEITHER THE CONCLUSIONS OF LA\V NOR THE
JUDGMENT IS SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS
OF FACT.

vVe have heretofore directed the attention of the
court to the fact that oral statements occuring before,
during or after the written instruments were executed
were inadmissible to vary the terms of the written instruments which were executed and which constitute the
agreement made by the parties. There is no other eYidence which supports or tends to support the findings
which plaintiff has attacked in his assignments.
Moreover even if it should be held, contrary to
plaintiff's contention, that such evidence was competent,
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still as we have heretofore :pointed out the same were
merged in the contracts and the warranty deed. In other
words the rights of the parties must be determined by
the terms of the ·written contracts and the warranty
deed. All the negotiations were merged in ·such documents. That being so the findings of the trial court
touching such negotiations cannot be said to aid the
defendants. Thus the findings as to the negotiations
become immaterial.
The conclusions of law and judgment must stand
or fall solely upon the terms of the contracts and the
warranty deed. There is no language in such instruments
which support or tend to support the conclusions of law
or the judgment. It thus follows that the findings of
fact do not support either the conclusions of law nor the
judgment.
The judgment appealed from should be reversed
with directions to grant a new trial with costs to appellant.
Respectfully submitted

J. Rulon Morgan
Elias Hansen
Att,o.rneys for Pla.intiff and
Appelavnt
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